

FIN-620

Game Theory

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Cursus	Sem.	Type
Finance		Obl.

Language of teaching	English
Credits	3
Session	
Exam	Written
Workload	90h
Hours	28
Courses	28
Number of positions	

Summary

The course provides an introduction to non-cooperative game theory for PhD and advanced graduate students. It contains an analysis of static and dynamic games with special emphasis on the role of information.

Content**1. Static Games of Complete Information**

- a. Course overview
- b. Strategic-Form Games
- c. Iterated Strict Dominance
- d. Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
- e. Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
- f. Correlated Equilibrium

2. Dynamic Games of Complete Information

- a. Extensive Form Games
- b. Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria
- c. Repeated Games and Folk Theorems
- d. Bargaining à la Rubinstein-Stahl

3. Static Games of Incomplete Information

- a. Bayesian Equilibrium
- b. Public good provision
- c. War of Attrition
- d. Purification and Mixed Strategies
- e. Market for Lemons
- f. No trade theorems

4. Auctions

- a. Orders of Stochastic Dominance
- b. First Price Auctions
- c. Dutch Auctions
- d. Second Price Auctions
- e. English Auctions
- f. Revenue Equivalence
- g. Common Values
- h. Share Auctions

5. Global Games

- a. Global games vs Bayesian Games
- b. Currency Attacks
- c. Coordination Likelihood

6. Mechanism Design

- a. Definition of Mechanism
- b. Revelation Principle
- c. Optimal Mechanisms
- d. Vickrey-Clarke Groves Mechanisms
- e. Budget Balance

7. Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information

- a. Signalling Games
- b. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
- c. Reputation
- d. Pooling, Separating and Semi-Separating Equilibria
- e. Spence's Education Model
- f. Equilibrium Refinements

8. Moral Hazard

- a. Linear Contracts
- b. General Contracts
- c. Dynamic Moral Hazard

Keywords

Game Theory
Contract Theory

Learning Prerequisites**Required courses**

Bachelor-level Calculus and Probability Theory

Recommended courses

Intermediate-level Microeconomics

Learning Outcomes

By the end of the course, the student must be able to:

- Define alternative notions of Equilibria
- Derive game equilibria and select among them
- Design games and incentive schemes to induce desired targets

Resources**Bibliography**

Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole, 1991, Game Theory, 7th Edition, MIT Press ISBN-13: 978-0262061414
Bolton, Patrick and Mathias Dewatripont, 2004, Contract Theory, MIT Press, ISBN-13: 978-0262025768

Ressources en bibliothèque

- [Game Theory / Fudenberg](#)
- [Contract Theory / Bolton](#)